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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/856,362	05/22/2001	Dominique Hamoir	Q64544	6876
23373	7590 07/28/2006		EXAMINER	
SUGHRUE N	•	PASCAL, LESLIE C		
SUITE 800	LVANIA AVENUE, N.W.		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
WASHINGTON, DC 20037			2613	
			DATE MAILED: 07/28/2006	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Advisory Action						
Before	the Filing	of an Appeal	Brief			

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
09/856,362	HAMOIR, DOMINIQUE	
Examiner	Art Unit	
Leslie Pascal	2613	

	Leslie Pascal	2613	
The MAILING DATE of this communication app	ears on the cover sheet with the o	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED 11 July 2006 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APP			
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or o this application, applicant must timely file one of the folloplaces the application in condition for allowance; (2) a N a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliar time periods:	owing replies: (1) an amendment, af otice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in	fidavit, or other evider compliance with 37 C	nce, which FR 41.31; or (3)
a) The period for reply expires <u>3</u> months from the mailing date	e of the final rejection.		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP	later than SIX MONTHS from the mailin (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	g date of the final rejecti	on.
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of e under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office late may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b) NOTICE OF APPEAL	xtension and the corresponding amount shortened statutory period for reply orig er than three months after the mailing da	of the fee. The approprinally set in the final Offi	iate extension fee ce action; or (2) as
 The Notice of Appeal was filed on 11 July 2006. A brief date of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or appeal. Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any repart AMENDMENTS 	any extension thereof (37 CFR 41.3	7(e)), to avoid dismis	sal of the
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection.	but prior to the date of filing a brief	will not be entered b	ACOUSA ACOUSA
(a) They raise new issues that would require further compared to they raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE bel	onsideration and/or search (see NO ow);	TE below);	
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in be appeal; and/or			the issues for
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a	-	ected claims.	
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a))			(DTOL 224)
 4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1. 5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s) 		impliant Amendment	(PTOL-324).
 Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s) Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be a non-allowable claim(s). 	,	timely filed amendme	ent canceling the
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a how the new or amended claims would be rejected is pro The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:		II be entered and an e	explanation of
Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected:			
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, b because applicant failed to provide a showing of good awas not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessa 	overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appe ry and was not earlier presented. S	al and/or appellant fa See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(ils to provide a 1).
 The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanating REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER 		_	
11. The request for reconsideration has been consideration has been consideration.	dered but does NOT place the appli	cation in condition for	allowance
12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s)	. (PTO/SB/08 or PTO-1449) Paper I	No(s)	Λ
13. Other:		Leslie Pascal Primary Examiner	<i>(</i>)

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In regard to the applicant's arguments with regard to "single means", the applicant argues that there must be a "means recitation to invoke the single means prohibition".

The section 2164.08(a) of the MPEP cites IN RE HYATT. The following is a quote from IN RE HYATT, (CAFC, 218 USPQ 195), on page 196.

The board noted at that time that claim 35 is a so-called "single means claim," that is, a claim drafted in "means-plus-function" format yet reciting only a single element instead of a combination. The board therefore entered a new rejection of claim 35 under 37 CFR 1.196(b), based on the second paragraph of 35 USC 112, ² for failure to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which appellant regarded as his invention. The board noted that the final paragraph of §112 ³ sanctions the use of the means-plus-function format for combination claims only. From that fact, coupled with appellant's attempted use of that format in claim 35, the board inferred that appellant had intended to claim a combination. Because claim 35 does not recite a combination, however, the board reasoned that it does not recite that which appellant *intended* to claim, and, hence, entered the new rejection. The board then reversed the §102 rejection, asserting that "the metes and bounds of the claimed invention set forth in claim 35, can only be determined through speculation as to the elements included in the implied combination of elements," so that it could not be said whether the reference relied upon by the examiner in fact anticipated the claimed invention.

In the first sentence, it says that a single means claim is drafted as a "means plus function" format reciting only a SINGLE ELEMENT instead of a combination. The case law is quite clear that it is referring to a single element. There is no requirement for the term "means" to be in the claim.

IN RE HYATT goes on to say on page 197:

"To set forth at the outset what should be apparent, claim 35 is a single means claim. It is not disputed that it is drafted in means-plus-function format, and it is not disputable that it is drawn to a single element. A mere *recital* of a multitude of elements or steps in a claim is not determinative of the *invention* it defines. A claim must be read in accordance with the precepts of English grammar. In claim 35, the invention defined is what follows the word "comprising." Indeed, appellant has admitted that claim 35 is drawn to only a single element when he asserts that it is not drawn to a combination. Appellant's denomination of every noun in the claim as a separate element ignores the fact that these words function as mere description of the single claimed means."

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It is clear from IN RE HYATT that a single element is considered a single means.

On page 3 of the applicant's argument, the applicant argues "there are no claims in this application directed to the fiber itself". In claim 24, the only means (element) claimed in a fiber. The arguments on this page refer to depletion and enrichment of the Raman effect of the fiber. It goes on to say that the fiber compensates for these depletions and enrichments. The examiner has asked specifically *twice* that if the fiber "causes and fixes the problems, is there really a problem?". The applicant has never answered this question. There are no other means in the claim to cause or fix the problem. The applicant requests that the examiner "point out more particularly what is recited in claim 24 that one of skill in the art would not be able to do" given what is described in the specification. The applicant claims a single element (means-see IN RE HYATT). Further, fiber is the cause of depletion and enrichment, yet in the applicant's claims, it

is compensating. If the fiber is causing and fixing the problem-is there a problem? As claimed, a well-known fiber is causing and fixing the problem. Why doesn't other fiber provide this function? Nothing in the claim makes it clear why or how the applicant's invention is novel.

This is the problem with single means claims. There is no combination to provide the function.

On page 4 of the arguments, the applicant argues that page 9, line 27 explains the enrichment compensation and page 11, lines 31-33 discusses distributed amplifiers. In regard to page 9, line 27, there is no mention of distribution. In regard to page 10, although line 4 mentions distributed amplifiers, this does not say that the distributed amplifiers are providing the compensation but the power used with either distributed amplifiers or discrete amplifiers. Further, lines 4-15 provide compensation using the transmission fiber, which appears to have the same problems as claim 24. The fiber is causing the problems and compensating for the problem. Further, it does not mention compensating in a distributed way. In regard to page 11, lines 31-33. This is discussing the first zone (depletion, not enrichment). It is not discussing the compensation of the enrichment of the channels, which is in the third zone. Claim 25 is dependent upon claim 11, which claims the enrichment of channels, which is done in the third zone. The applicant does not disclose using compensation in a distributed way in the third zone.

In regard to the applicant's arguments with regard to Saleh, the applicant argues elements, which are not claimed. The applicant argues that Saleh teaches "partitioning" the different wavelengths while the applicant "explained that energy transfers will be of different types in different wavelength regions, and each is compensated for in an appropriate way." Not only is this NOT

CLAIMED, but also it appears to be similar to Saleh's partitioning into different wavelength bands.

The applicant argues that Saleh only teaches the band of 1520-1565 nm on page 5. It is unclear what the applicant means by this, Saleh specifically talks about using different bands (expanding to 1620 nm in column 8, lines 8-10 and using the C and L bands together; column 10, lines 33-42). From the applicant's specification, it appears that different bands are compensated in different ways. Saleh teaches compensating for different bands in different ways. The applicant teaches specific means which provide specific compensation. It is unclear to the examiner why the applicant's means (which are also taught by Saleh) provide a different function than those provided by the applicant. The question is not only whether it is obvious, but also if it is inherent that the applicant's means (for example a distributed amplifier) which provides a specific function, is also provided by Saleh. The applicant now has the burden to explain why each of the similar elements of Saleh do not provide the same function of the applicant's. The applicant's specification is vague as to how the elements provide such a function. This may shift more burdens on the applicant. Since the specification just says, for example, that distributed amplifiers compensate the first zone. It appears that this is well known or inherent. There does not appear to be any details. Therefore, it would appear that using distributed amplifiers (as taught by Saleh) would provide this function. It does not matter whether Saleh knew that he was compensating for specific problems, if he was inherently doing it. Further, if he selects amplifiers based on how they function in a particular band, it is obvious that he would select the amplifiers based on which band he is using and which would provide the best signal. On page 7,

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the applicant argues that applicant's Raman amplifier has had its gain set to compensate for the Raman effect. In the specification, it is not apparent that the amplification is SET. It appears that the applicant selects different types of amplifiers for different bands. This is what it appears that Saleh does. In regard to the arguments of Chraplyvy, Saleh teaches an upper band which can be used with other bands. Chraplyvy teaches compensating for the enrichment in upper part of a band. It would have been obvious to compensate for the upper part of the band of Saleh which would inherently have enrichments, with the teaching of Chraplyvy in order to avoid the noise caused by the enrichment.